PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the Committee on Foreign Relations held a short but most interesting series of hearings earlier this year on the subject of the psychological aspects of foreign policy—a subject which both the public and the bureaucracy tend to ignore.

Miss Elizabeth Wharton, of the United Press International, wrote a brief but perceptive article on those hearings. The article has been printed rather widely.

In view of its succinct summary of the hearings and the fact that it focuses on some of the fundamental problems nations have in communicating with each other, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. The article appeared in the Tampa Tribune-Times of Sunday, July 20, 1969.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AS TOOL OF DIPLOMACY

(By Elizabeth Wharton)

WASHINGTON.—An American is brought up to look a man in the eye when talking to him. He also is conditioned by his culture to keep a certain distance from a person with whom he's conversing.

An Arab is taught from childhood that looking a man in the eye during conversation is extremely rude. He also is accustomed to stand quite close to a person with whom he's talking.

If an American meets an Arab, and neither is aware of the other's cultural conditioning, any conversation between them is likely to produce serious misunderstanding and mutual irritation. The American thinks the Arab is crowding in too close, so he steps back, which insults the Arab. The American thinks the Arab is shifty because he won't look him in the eye, and the Arab thinks the American is trying to stare him down.

Social scientists, particularly in the so-called behavioral fields of anthropology and psychology, recognize these cultural differences and understand how important they can be as a cause of friction.

Governments—and most people—do not.

In an effort to determine what insights social science studies might offer to smooth the path of international relations, Chairman J. William Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a series of hearings on the subject of "anthropological and psychological aspects of U.S. foreign policy."

Witnesses were Dr. Margaret Mead, anthropologist, writer, and curator for ethnology at the American Museum of Natural History in New York; Dr. Karl Menninger, noted psychiatrist, founder and president of the Menninger Clinic and Menninger Foundation in Kansas; and Dr. Edward T. Hall, author and professor of anthropology at Northwestern University.

All three believe behavioral science could make a significant contribution to the quest for peace and international amity.

They cited the experience of World War II, when intensive U.S. research on Japanese culture yielded two outstanding successes and many minor ones.

The first achievement concerned treatment of Japanese prisoners of war. When American military commanders began taking their first prisoners in the Pacific islands, the Japanese not only freely discussed military secrets but even offered to help their captors track down installations and ammunition dumps.

"The Americans didn't trust the prisoners, of course, since Americans are conditioned not to give such information to their captors. We told them the prisoners could be trusted because the Japanese had never been conditioned to being taken prisoner," Dr. Hall explained. "Their culture decreed that they be good soldiers, and to them being good soldiers also meant being good prisoners. We were right, and the information proved very useful."

The second great success was in persuading the U.S. Government to permit the Japanese to retain the Emperor after the war—a recommendation made by the behavioral scientists within months after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

If the Emperor had been forced to abdicate, Dr. Mead said, Japanese society would have taken generations, instead of just a few years, to recover from the war.

Government-sponsored behavioral studies tapered off after the war, and the entire field of social science fell into dispute during what Dr. Menninger called the "rampant know-nothingism" of the late 40s' and early 50s'.

The three experts suggested that a number of national crises since then could have been averted, or, at least, ameliorated, if such research were still being done as a guide to government policy. Dr. Mead cited two examples:

The first was the Pueblo incident. To North Koreans, truth is an elastic concept in which bare facts are less important than the interpretation one chooses to place upon them. They knew the Pueblo was off-shore spying on them, and whether the ship was a few miles inside or a few miles outside an invisible line on the water simply didn't have anything to do with it.

But Americans rely on facts, and our instruments proved the ship was a certain number of miles outside the invisible line.

The final settlement, under which the United States agreed to sign a "confession" of invading North Korean territory—and promptly repudiated it—might have been reached much sooner than it was if the behavioral scientists had been consulted, Dr. Mead said.

Her second example was the violent disruption which resulted from the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision of 1954. Behavioral scientists had warned in advance, she said, that such a drastic change must be effected rapidly.

"To the human mind, anticipated change is frightening, while accomplished change is accepted," she explained. Therefore, she feels it was the clause in the decision which allowed local governments to move "with all deliberate speed" which caused all the trouble.

Hall said the practice of sending American representatives abroad without preparation on the mores of the society to which they were going subjected them to a "culture shock" from which they might never recover enough to do the job they set out to do.

He used time as an example. The United States, he said, is a "monochronic" culture which times everything to the minute and in which the people, the industry and the government function on a set schedule.

Latin America, on the other hand, is a "polychronic" society in which people set little store by schedules, and consider times set for appointments to be only an approximation.

"Both time systems work, but they work in different ways," he said. "What is more, they do not mix.

"I have observed a number of Americans . . . fail in their mission because they never learned to read the local time customs."

At the same time, Hall continued, Americans feel a terrible need to be loved, cannot tolerate criticism from others and don't think much of self-criticism either.

"We have to feel we are doing well all the time," he said. "It's a real problem, because it is self-defeating to be complacent."

All three witnesses agreed that consulting social scientists on national policy would give the United States an enormous advantage over the Communist world whose inflexible ideological framework has no room for unfettered social research.

Fulbright agrees, but says he has not yet decided how to go about trying to convince a U.S. bureaucracy which has a certain inflexibility of its own.

"We spend an enormous amount of money collecting information about the Russians," the Senator explained. "I should think it would be a very good investment to spend even a little money hiring behavioral scientists to interpret the information and draw conclusions from it."

TAX SURCHARGE PASSAGE

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, each day this body delays action on the extension of the surcharge, our Nation drifts farther down the road to fiscal irresponsibility. At the domestic level, fuel is added to the fire of inflation with our deficit spending continuing because our revenue does not equal our expenditures.

The grocery bag for the welfare recipient, or those on a fixed income, shrinks in size as prices continue to skyrocket. This results from many circumstances prevalent in our economy today, not the least of which is the loss of confidence in the American dollar.

Our dollar is also in jeopardy in the world money market if we do not stabilize our economy with a more favorable balance of payments. To improve our balance-of-payments position we must increase our exports, decrease our imports, or improve our dollar flow. Of course it could be a combination of these corrections that could result in a favorable fiscal position. We must convince the other nations of the world of our willingness to get our financial house in order. No one knows whether the economy might break during this critical waiting period while we await the passage of the surtax extension. It has happened before when circumstances did not seem any more threatening.

Because of inflation, we are losing the ability to compete; other countries are winning a greater percentage of world trade. The trend is starting to rapidly increase in their direction. Whether we talk about steel, motor vehicles, or a vast number of other products including sophisticated electronic equipment, we are losing the battle.

In recent years we have become net importers of iron and steel mill products and the gap is still increasing. We are net importers of paper, yarns, fabrics, and man-made fibers. Our trade position has swung to the deficit side with Canada since 1967, a deficit with Japan since 1964, and a deficit with Germany since 1965.

In a 5-year outlook, published in April of 1969, the U.S. Department of Commerce says this:

Moderating U.S. inflationary pressures . . . is a basic prerequisite for improving the trade balance . . .

Millions of jobs are being lost to American workers by our loss of in-